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ABSTRACT
Media and network systems capture and store data about electronic activity in new, sometimes
unprecedented ways; computational systems make for new means of analysis and knowledge
development. These new forms offer new, powerful tactical tools for investigations of electronic
malfeasance under traditional legal regulation of state power, particular that of Fourth
Amendment limitations on police searches and seizures under the U.S. Constitution. But
autonomy, identity and authenticity concerns with electronic data raise issues of public policy,
privacy and proper police oversight of civil society. We examine those issues and their
implications for digital and computational forensics
Keywords: identity, authentication, digital, computation, forensics, probable cause,
privacy, security, search, seizure

1. INTRODUCTION
Privacy is “the right to be left alone”
(Brandeis and Warren, 1890). Fundamental
to that right are restrictions on state power
to intrude into personal affairs. The hallmark
is the Fourth Amendment and its limitations
on domestic police searches and seizures
under the U.S. Constitution set forth at the
founding of the Republic more than two
hundred years ago. Prophetically, Justice
Brandeis in 1928 warned of progress in
science that would lead to unimagined
invasions of personal privacy (Olmstead v.
United States, 277).
Restrictions on intrusions into the
"private" activities of people do not
necessarily apply to non-content related
material disclosed to third parties or data
transfers across borders nor are they limited
to those set out in the federal constitution.
National security needs may impact access to
activities otherwise protected by the Fourth
Amendment. Statutory protections, federal
and state, may exceed or refine Fourth
Amendment protections, such as under the
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Electronic Communications Privacy Act and
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
The hallmark is that the Fourth
Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches
and seizures. What is reasonable or
unreasonable may not be easily or
algorithmically defined for the vast, diverse
scope of human actions. It generally permits
a thorough police search of a person’s home,
person, papers and effects only where there is
probable cause that evidence of a crime may
be found or that person has committed a
crime. Lesser kinds of intrusions may be
justified by the lesser standard of objective
facts supporting reasonable suspicion. And
the use of data for inferences need meet no
standard as to make someone a "person of
interest" in an investigation.
The growth of massive data sets and
powerful analytics has led to practical
changes in the profiling of individuals in
ways never anticipated.
Ohm notes as to
access to personal information on one's life,
"Today's technology poses a constitutional
puzzle that is different in kind, not just in
Page 197
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degree, from the one solved only a few
decades ago" (Ohm, 2011). Given the
massive data storage and analytic capabilities
of systems, traditional police investigative
conduct and search warrants, with their
traditional particularity requirements, are
morphing into what some consider the
functional equivalent of intrusive general
warrants of search so hated by the Founders
of the Republic.

or IP address in system data of contraband
servers. Little other indicia of the identity or
authentication of the transaction is needed
for the issuance of a warrant for search and
seizure.

If a person's data life is engaged in a
cloud system, then search of that system can
be a search, analysis and conclusion on an
entire personal life.
Similarly, personal electronic devices,
most commonly a cellular telephone, can hold
massive amounts of information about one’s
personal life in ways never before anticipated.
Connected to other systems, they are the
data life of their holders. Conversely, some
argue that vetted computational systems can
bring greater accuracy and less bias to
forensic analysis as it extends investigative
powers (Srihari, 2010). It can even serve to
support the "digital innocence" of a subject
wrongfully accused (Fairfield and Luna,
2014).
The digital age uses digital facts,
particularly items such as addressing
numbers under the Internet Protocol, GPS
location data and alphanumerical identifiers
used for authentication and identification in
online transactions. These artifacts become
the evidence used for making such
determinations to search or seize. Given the
technical issues with evidence preservation
and examination in electronic storage media,
search warrants relating to computing
systems may direct the seizure of computers
and data collections and removal off-site for
examination in a computer forensics facility.
These digital facts include the metadata
and transactional data associated with
electronic
activity.
These
may
be
independent of any content of the electronic
transaction but still sufficient, in direct or
circumstantial context,
The combination of these circumstances
has led to the search of homes and businesses
and seizure the computers therein based on
finding a credit card number, e-mail address
Page 198

This
reliance
on
simple
digital
identification with minimal authentication
further corrodes privacy and liberty rights in
new ways.

2. “PROBABLE CAUSE”
THAT A COMPUTER
CRIME HAS BEEN
COMMITTED AND A
STATE INVASION OF A
PERSON’S HOME, PERSON
AND COMPUTERS IS
JUSTIFIED
Electronic evidence alone or matched with
other evidence may indicate a crime and
additional evidence of that crime. That
additional evidence, once obtained, can
correlate the electronic record with other
actions. This correlation and development
role is particularly important for remote data
collected over networks; correlation to other
evidence is a key function of electronic
evidence in prosecuting a digital crime
(Carrier,
2005).
Absent
special
circumstances, the search or seizure of a
person or his effects without consent is illegal
in the U.S. unless
1) an application under oath is made
2) before a neutral magistrate that
3) details facts that establish “probable
cause” to believe a crime has been
committed and evidence of that crime
will be found in the place searched
and things seized.
“Probable cause” itself means a "fair
probability" under a common sense analysis
that evidence is to be found at the place to
be searched; this was defined as being less
that the “preponderance of the evidence”
standard to support other judicial findings
(Illinois v. Gates, 462). An application for a
search is to be judged under the "totality of
the circumstances" presented. Id.
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With the accumulation of network
forensic and system data in so many forms,
as well as the volatility and multiplicity of
that data, what data is sufficient to say there
is a fair probability that a particular network
or system user has contraband or evidence of
a crime on his or her computer? Once that
quantum is defined, police power is
essentially unlimited once that measure is
met by evidence.
This
sensitivity
to
constitutional
principles is most strenuously tested when
looking at the “heroin of cyberspace,” child
pornography (Howell, 2004). It is one of the
most inflammatory misuses of networks; it is
useful for analysis precisely because it is a
crime to have it in digital possession
(Losavio, 2005).

2.1 The Boundaries of “Fair Probability”
of Digital Evidence of Crime
A series of court cases in the United States
have approved the powerful tactical use of
electronic data to justify issuance of warrants
to search and seize computers. These cases
push the boundaries of the Fourth
Amendment and notions of identity and
authentication in digital environments. They
rely on system-collected data independent of
actual network transactions of downloading
or uploading contraband.
These tools raise issues of law, public
policy and privacy as to proper police
oversight of civil society. There is concern
generally that existing rules fail to properly
deal with digital evidence (Kerr, 2005). “"In
the old days, the laws against illegal search
and seizure were interpreted much more
strictly," one defense counsel notes, "but as
this technology develops, the definition of
probable cause will most likely be expanded””
(Silberman, 2002).
The boundaries of “Fair Probability” of
the existence of criminal evidence are
strained by decisions of the U.S. Courts.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held, in essence, that on-line
membership
information
describing
a
particular person in a child pornography
website was sufficient to justify the search
and seizure of that person’s computer.
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(United States v. Gourde, 440). The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit said "It is
common sense that an individual who joins
such a site would more than likely download
and possess such material" (United States v.
Martin, 426).
But the Ninth Circuit’s case, United
States v. Gourde, had no evidence of network
activity transferring contraband files to
Gourde’s computer, either through express
download/ftp transfer, e-mail or simple http
transfer via the web browser.
This case provoked both dissent and
public concern over the boundaries of
network-transmitted data and user liability
(Maclean, 2006).

2.2 General Principle or Fact Specific –
The Affidavit for the Search
Gourde pled guilty to possession of 100
computer images of child pornography,
violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252 and 2252A,
but reserved the right to challenge the FBI’s
seizure of his computer, where the definitive
evidence of his crime was found. If Gourde
showed there was no probable cause to
believe there was evidence of a crime on his
computer, the seizure and search would have
been illegal and the evidence found could not
be used against him; as there was no other
evidence, his conviction would not stand and
he would be released.
What distinguished Gourde’s case from
others was that there was no direct evidence
of possession of these illegal images by
Gourde. Gourde’s "steps to affirmatively
join" the website, were shown by
membership data, which included his credit
card, via a web page showing questionable
material.
What was not raised in the affidavit was
any evidence that Gourde had actually
downloaded child pornography images or
that it was Gourde himself that had joined
the website.
Similarly, in the Second Circuit’s case
United States v. Martin, the supporting
affidavit was deemed sufficient where it
showed there was evidence “that an e-mail
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address of a “girls12-16” member was linked
to Martin's house…”

producing non-criminal inferences that still
may impact the privacy of one’s affairs and
what, if any, limits should be placed on that
by statute or common law construction.

Thus identification data with minimal
authentication may support the issuance of a
state warrant to search and seize an
implicated computer system. Yet the Court
of Appeals did note that
The internet is not a safe haven for
illicit conduct. Rather, it is a digital
community where the zeros and ones
that translate into visible and audible
expressions have legal consequences.
Although we will be diligent to guard
against
unlawful
searches and
seizures, even at the digital divide,
the internet does not present an
exception to established principles of
probable cause. Id., at 89
This remains the standard relating to
issuance of search warrants relating to
activity associated with digital contraband
and IP address identification (United States
v. Robinson, United States v. Strausbaugh,
& United States v. Valley). Indeed, combined
with the persistence of electronic evidence in
certain media, the traditional doctrine of
“staleness,” that old information is unreliable
as to establish a fair probability that
evidence might still be in a particular
location, applies differently to electronic and
digital evidence; old information too stale to
support a warrant for physical evidence will
still support a warrant for digital artifacts
that may be cast about and persist in their
related media (United States v. Valley).

2.3 FISA Warrants
Similar
concerns
relate
to
domestic
surveillance under orders issues by the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)
and the FISA court. Transactional metadata
for international communications fall outside
of Fourth Amendment and statutory
protections under U.S. law, but if those lead
to purely domestic communications where
metadata and content data are needed then a
court ordered is needed. The issue is
determining the quantum of evidence,
particularly inferences from metadata, that
support issuance of such orders. A related
issue is the what should be done with data
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3. IMPLICATIONS FOR
PRIVACY AND SECURITY
These cases imply an exceptionally low
standard of electronic evidence in support of
the power of the search warrant. The ease of
fabrication of electronic evidence goes far
beyond what is possible with other media
and is accomplished through common, nontechnical means (Losavio, 2006). This creates
a possibility for exceptional abuse through
the application of police power. Cyber
extortion using child pornography is a global
issue (The Straits Times, 2005; The Toronto
Star, 2003; Wright, 2005). Such standards
offer opportunities to abuse through planted
and spoofed evidence without incentive to
authenticate data or correlate it to other
evidence of criminal activity.
On the other hand, the shear poison of
child pornography may lead the courts and
justice agencies to treat it differently than
other criminal activity such that this
seemingly lesser standard does not apply
elsewhere. Yet when this material falsity was
raised in Martin, and other cases, the courts
relied on system data to validate police
action.
Judge Poole’s dissent in Martin accuses
the court of creating just such an exception;
the danger is that this exception might
become the rule.
Reliance on such minimally authenticated
digital data has contributed to the expansion
of “identity theft,” itself both a financial
crime and a violation of personal privacy
through the false exploitation of another’s
good name, credit history and right not to be
hassled by bill collectors. Now it may justify
expansion of state invasions of personal
privacy.
Caloyannides notes with digital evidence
“The potential for a miscarriage of justice is
vast,” (Caloyannides, 2004). As the U.S.
Supreme Court observed in a denying
immunity to government agents for the
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seizure of computers and their subsequent
destruction during examination:

didn't understand what was going on
(Fox News, 2007).

Susan Hallock owned a computer
software business that she and her
husband, Richard, operated from
home. After information about
Richard Hallock's credit card was
stolen and used to pay the
subscription fee for a child pornography
Web site, agents of the United States
Customs Service, investigating the
Web site, traced he payment to
Richard Hallock's card and got a
warrant to search the Hallocks'
residence. With that authority, they
seized
the
Hallocks'
computer
equipment, software, and disk drives.
No criminal charges were ever
brought, but the Government's
actions produced a different disaster.
When the computer equipment was
returned, several of the disk drives
were damaged, all of the stored data
(including trade secrets and account
files) were lost, and the Hallocks were
forced out of business (Will v.
Hallock, 2006).

Some of these concerns were presaged in
the GPS tracking and analytics case of
United States v. Jones, where several justices
commented on the change in privacy
relations that may
be created by
computational. The Supreme Court in United
States v. Jones required a search warrant to
justify the placement of an electronic
tracking device on a suspect’s vehicle,
holding it constituted a physical trespass
permitted only upon finding of probable
cause. But in that opinion Justice Sonja
Sotomayor further suggested the need to
reconsider what privacy means in an era of
massive third party data collection and
analysis. (concurring opinion, United States v
Jones). Jones dealt with one facet of the
new data reality, that of the massive and
inexpensive collection of positional GPS data
and analytics to quickly produce a profile of
a subject’s activities. Equally applicable to
the growing data and analytical power of
digital forensics, Justice Sotomayor wrote:

But that miscarriage of justice can be far
worse, with conviction and imprisonment
based on digital contraband on a computer a
person may not have had dominion over. An
appalling example is the Amero case, where a
substitute
seventh-grade
teacher
was
convicted of four felonies of exposing minors
to pornography on the classroom computer
based
on
erroneous
testimony
that
pornography pop-ups can only be fetched by
intentionally and deliberately accessing the
material (Krebs, 2014). After facing up to 40
years in prison, Ms. Amero was granted a
new trial based on testimony and analysis by
computer specialists that refuted that claim
and found both lapsed firewall, anti-virus and
spyware protection on the computer and
various spyware programs; her attorney
observed
The lesson from this is: All of us are
subject to the whims of these
computers, these great machines that
all of a sudden can create a criminal
case against someone like Julie, who
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The net result is that …—by making
available at a relatively low cost such
a substantial quantum of intimate
information about any person whom
the Government, in its unfettered
discretion, chooses to track—may
“alter the relationship between citizen
and government in a way that is
inimical to democratic society.”
The Supreme Court directly addressed
these concerns as to the requirements to
search massive portable data collections in
mobile cellular telephones in the 2014 cases
of Riley v. California and United States v.
Wurie, where it held illegal the warrantless
search of a cellular telephone seized from an
arrestee, distinguishing a cell phone search
from a traditional search incident to an
arrest.
The touchstone of the analysis by the
Supreme Court was this balancing of
interests “by assessing, on the one hand, the
degree to which it intrudes upon an
individual’s privacy and, on the other, the
degree to which it is needed for the
promotion
of
legitimate
governmental
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interests.”(citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526
U. S. 295, 300 (1999)). In declining to apply
prior precedent that upheld a search of items
found on a person incident to their arrest,
the Supreme Court found that cell phone
technology, including its uniquely personal
and massive data profile, did not present any
risk of the destruction of evidence or danger
to an officer that outweighed the privacy
interests of the phone’s owner that were
enlarged from other personal artifacts by the
nature of the vast data storage. Thus a
search of a cell phone by police is
unreasonable absent a warrant based upon
probable cause that the cell phone held
evidence of a crime or was itself an
instrumentality of a crime.

domains of society. The challenge will be to
establish a balance where courts set a stricter
boundary for state searches and seizures
based on electronic evidence of questionable
reliability.

Similarly, the limits, if any, to electronic
surveillance by the National Security Agency,
may be subject to Supreme Court analysis.
These will further define digital and
computational forensic practice and the
privacy of people within this domain.

4. CONCLUSION
We now live in a new space of information
density, one where relatively inexpensive
technologies can give every government the
surveillance powers possessed by the old
German Democratic Republic’s Stasi and the
current regime of North Korea. This may
have an impact on how people relate to each
other and to how we are governed.
In the United States, the Fourth
Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States limits the power of police to
search and seize a person, his computer and
related transaction/content data:
The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation,
and
particularly
describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be
seized. IV Amend. (1791)
Technical security cannot protect privacy
and security with such attitudes towards
data. Security policy must extend into all
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The Gourde court observed
… Given the current environment of
increasing government surveillance
and the long memories of computers,
we must not let the nature of the
alleged crime, child pornography,
skew our analysis or make us "lax" in
our duty to guard the privacy
protected by the Fourth Amendment.
We are acutely aware that the digital
universe poses particular challenges
with
respect
to
the
Fourth
Amendment.
The Supreme Court in United States v.
Jones and Riley v. California established
bounds for those challenges, albeit within the
traditions of our Constitution. That
awareness still needs greater knowledge of
the facts of identity and authenticity of
electronic data as evidence, its mutability
and evanescence, if the rights and liberties
and privacy of citizens are to be honored.
That may be further developed with rulings
on the limits that may be placed on FISA
surveillance of the lives of the many (Hurley,
2014).
The
future
regulation
of
the
informational lives of everyone will shape
how the relationships between citizen and
government evolve.
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